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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
(1) T h e district court found that several provisions 
of the A l a b a m a Constitution of 1901 w e r e adopted for the 
purpose of limiting the imposition on whites of property 
taxes that would p a y for the education of black public 
school students. T h e first question presented is: 
D o black public school children and their 
parents have standing to challenge the validity 
under the E q u a l Protection Clause of state 
constitutional provisions adop ted for the 
purpose of limiting the imposition on whites of 
property taxes that would be used to educate 
black public school students? 
(2) In 2004 the District Judge in Knight v. Alabama 
held that certain aspects of A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 
to the A l a b a m a Constitution were adopted for racially 
discriminatory reasons. In 2011 the District Judge in 
the instant case, applying different legal standards, 
concluded that the A m e n d m e n t s were enacted for a non-
discriminatory purpose. T h e second question presented 
is: 
W h i c h district judge applied the correct 
constitutional standard? 
(3) T h e district court in the instant case found that 
prior to 1971 real property in A l a b a m a w a s assessed 
far below its fair m a r k e t value, a n d that the "primar[y]" 
reason for those low assessments w a s to protect white 
landowners from paying property taxes that w o u l d be 
used to educate black public school students. After 
ii 
1971 Alabama adopted two constitutional amendments 
whose purpose, the court of appeals recognized, was to 
"entrench" those race-based pre-1971 assessments. The 
third question presented is: 
Is the Equal Protection Clause violated by a 
state constitutional amendment adopted for the 
purpose of entrenching pre-existing race-based 
property tax assessments? 
iii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The petitioners are India Lynch, by her parent Shawn 
King Lynch, Wendell Pride, Jr., by his parent Wendell 
Pride, Ivy Rose Ball, by her parent Miranda Ball, Slade 
Berryman and Cannon Berryman, by their parent Tyler 
Berryman, Rochester Anderson and Cezanne Anderson, 
by their parent Stella Anderson, Michael R a y m o n d 
Brooks, by his parent Michael Brooks, Zekeiah Ormond, 
by his parent Barbara L . Ormond. This action was filed 
as a class action on behalf of all black and white public 
school students in Alabama. 
The defendants are the state of Alabama, Robert 
Bentley, in his official capacity as Governor of Alabama, 
and Julie P. Magee, in her official capacity as Commissioner 
of Revenue. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED i 
PARTIES TO T H E PROCEEDING iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS iv 
TABLE OF APPENDICES vi 
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES vii 
OPINIONS B E L O W 1 
JURISDICTION 1 
STATUTORY A N D CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1 
Introduction 1 
The 1875 and 1901 Constitutional Limits on 
Millage Rates 3 
The 1971 and 1978 Constitutional Limits on 
Property Assessments 6 
PROCEEDINGS B E L O W 13 
V 
Table of Contents 
Page 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 15 
I. T h e Eleventh Circuit's Holding Tha t Black 
Children and Parents L a c k Standing to 
Challenge Racially Motivated Property 
T a x Restrictions Is Inconsistent Wi th T h e 
Decisions of This Court 16 
II. T h e L o w e r Courts' Rejection of T h e Intent-
Based Challenge to A m e n d m e n t s 325and 373 
Rests O n Standards That A r e Inconsistent 
W i t h T h e Decisions of This Cour t 21 
III. T h e L o w e r Courts' Rejection of T h e 
Claim That A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 
Unconstitutionally Perpetuate Prior 
Discriminatory Practices Rests O n A 
Standard That Is Inconsistent With The 
Decisions of This Court 28 
IV. This Case Presents Issues of Exceptional 
Importance 32 
CONCLUSION 35 
vi 
TABLE OF APPENDICES 
Page 
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED 
STATES C O U R T OF A P P E A L S FOR 
T H E E L E V E N T H CIRCUIT, D A T E D 
JANUARY 10, 2014 la 
A P P E N D I X B — C O R R E C T E D 
M E M O R A N D U M OF OPINION OF T H E 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, 
DATED NOVEMBER 7, 2011 30a 
APPENDIX C — CONSTITUTIONAL A N D 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 1098a 
vii 
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
347 U . S . 483 (1954) 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) 
Crawford v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 
458 U . S . 527 (1982) 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
391 U . S . 430 (1968) 
Hunter v. Erickson, 
393 U S . 385 (1969) 
James v. Valtierra, 
402 U . S . 137 (1971) 
Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 
405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.) 
Knight v. Alabama, 
458 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (N.D. Ala. 2004) 
Medina v. Clinton, 
86 F.3d 155 (9th Cir. 1996) 
Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of the City of Jackson, 
391 U . S . 450 (1968) 
viii 
Cited Authorities 
Myers v. Anderson, 
238 U.S . 368 (1915) 
Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S . 620 (1996) 
San Antonio Ind. School Dist v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S . 1 (1972) 
Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S . 630 (1993) 
Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 
131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 
429 U.S . 252 (1977) 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
458 U.S . 457 (1982) 
Weissinger v. Boswell, 
330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. Ala. 1971) 
ix 
Cited Authorities 
Statutes and Other Authorities 
28 U . S . C . § 1254(1) 
Alabama Constitution of 1875 
Alabama Constitution of 1901 
Alabama Constitution, Section 215 
Alabama Constitution, Section 216 
Alabama Constitution, Section 269 
Alabama Constitution, Section 325 
Alabama Constitution, Section 373 
1 
Petitioners India Lynch, et al., respectfully pray 
that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review the 
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals entered on January 10, 2014. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The January 10, 2104 opinion of the court of appeals, 
which is reported at 739 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014), is 
set out at pp. 1a-29a of the Appendix. The November 7, 
2011 opinion of the district court, which is not officially 
reported, is set out at pp. 30a-1097a of the Appendix. 
JURISDICTION 
The decision of the court of appeals was entered on 
January 10, 2014. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U . S . C . § 1254(1). 
STATUTORY A N D CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
The statutory and constitutional provisions involved 
are set out in the petition appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Introduction 
This is a case of truly exceptional importance, one 
which will determine whether tens of thousands of public 
school children in the state of Alabama will continue 
to be denied an adequate education "in underfunded, 
dilapidated schools." (App.l044a). In 1875, 1901, 1971 
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and 1978 Alabama adopted a series of constitutional 
provisions which increasingly constricted the authority 
of local elected officials to levy property taxes for the 
public schools. Those Alabama constitutional restrictions 
have "had a crippling effect on poor, majority black school 
districts." Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1299 
(N.D.Al??a. 2004); App.109a. T w o federal trial judges 
concluded that some or all of those state constitutional 
constraints were adopted for the purpose of protecting 
white landowners from having to pay property taxes 
that would be used to educate black students. But the 
lower courts in this case, applying legal standards that 
are clearly inconsistent with the decisions of this Court, 
denied any remedy to those students. 
Property taxes in Alabama are largely governed 
by two elements: the tax (or "millage") rate and the 
assessed valuation. The tax rate is expressed in mills; 1 
mill represents a tax rate of 0.1 %. The millage rates for 
county and state property taxes in Alabama were first 
limited by provisions of the 1875 Constitution, and again 
capped by provisions of the 1901 Constitution, which (with 
some modification) remain in effect today. County (and 
other local) officials m a y not impose a property tax in 
excess of those constitutionally imposed limitations except 
by means of a constitutional amendment, or by using 
a complex process that requires approval by the state 
legislature. (App.10a). The assessed value of property was 
limited by constitutional amendments adopted in 1971 
and 1978. A s a result of those amendments, the assessed 
value of property in Alabama is required to be far lower 
than its actual fair market value. The overwhelming 
majority of local funds for public schools is derived from 
local property taxes, and a large majority of all property 
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taxes In Alabama is used to support the public schools. A s 
a practical matter, any state restriction on locally imposed 
property taxes is a limitation on the ability of local officials 
to fund the public schools. 
T h e 1875 and 1901 Constitutional Limits on Millage 
Rates 
T h e Alabama constitutional restrictions on the mill 
rates that can be adopted by county officials to levy 
taxes for the public schools were a direct response to 
events that occurred during Reconstruction. Republican 
officeholders had increased millage rates, and devoted 
m u c h of the n e w revenue to education. "[B]lacks received 
the bulk of the benefits of the increased tax revenues— 
most notably public education—but only a minuscule 
minority of the race were paying any property taxes. 
T o say the least, that fact did not 'sit well' with white 
taxpayers." (App.703a)(emphasis in original). "Whites 
... were vehemently opposed to education of the former 
slaves, believing that it undermined white supremacy 
[W]hites deeply resented paying taxes . . . ' . . . to run 
useless schools for the Freedmen. ' " (App.704a)(quoting 
Thornton Dep . , 50-52). 
White supremacists soon returned to power and in 1875 
enacted a n e w constitution. The district court found that 
whites from the Black Belt region of Alabama were "intent 
o n . . . using th[eir] new control to protect themselves from 
the possibility that the black majorities in their counties 
would ever again be able to use . . . political power . . . to 
tax them in a way that would force them as the property 
holders to cough up funds . . . which would be used to the 
benefit of the majority of the people in the Black Belt w h o 
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were black...." (App.717a-18a)(quoting Thornton Dep., at 
67-68). "In order to obstruct black political office holders 
from collecting substantial property taxes in the future, 
property tax restrictions, or 'caps,' were for the first 
time embedded into the text of an Alabama constitution." 
(App.718a). "[T]he property tax caps targeted blacks for 
a specific purpose. The property tax restrictions were 
intended to prevent the possibility that taxes could again be 
levied on the property of Alabama Planters in an onerous 
amount for the purpose of educating blacks...." (App.719a-
21a) (emphasis by district court). "[T]he millage caps woven 
into the fabric of the 1875 Constitution were motivated by 
the fears... that blacks might again obtain political power, 
and increase tax millage in order to fund 'radical' programs, 
such as education for the Freedmen." (App.811a). The 1875 
Constitution imposed a cap of 5 mills on any property tax 
levied by a county or city. 
The millage caps, with minor modification, were 
again embodied in the 1901 Constitution, most of whose 
provisions remain in effect today. The district court 
concluded that "[t]he two most important issues to come 
before the 1901 constitutional Convention, other than 
disenfranchisement, were taxation and education. . . . 
Delegates to the 1901 Constitutional Convention . . . were 
opposed to the education of black children, and firmly 
against the funding of black schools with white dollars." 
(App.803a). "[S]tate and local property tax restrictions 
were adopted for the purpose of protecting white 
taxpayers from the threats of 'black rule' and increased 
taxation for the purpose of funding equitable and adequate 
education opportunities . . . to blacks." (App. 814a) While 
a pervasive theme of the 1901 Constitutional Convention 
was the disenfranchisement of black citizens, "the records 
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also clearly and convincingly establish that another 
objective of nearly equal importance to a large majority 
of the delegates was that of reaffirming those provisions 
of the 1875 Constitution suppressing the millage rates of 
ad valorem property taxes that could be devoted to the 
support of black education at public expense." (App.l002a). 
Sections 215 and 216 of the 1901 Constitution, like 
provisions in the 1875 Constitution, limited county and 
city property taxes each to 5 mills. Section 269 authorized 
counties to levy an additional one mill tax for education, 
subject to a n e w requirement. "[T]his optional tax 
required, for the first time in Alabama history, a voter 
referendum, thus ensuring that only those w h o could vote 
(i.e., whites) had the authority to raise taxes for education 
in their counties." (App.810a)(emphasis in original). The 
district court concluded that "[t]he evidence in the record 
demonstrates that Sections . . . 215, 216 and 269 of the 
1901 Alabama Constitution were enacted with a racially 
discriminatory intent." (App.1019a). 
The millage caps in sections 215 and 216 remain in 
effect to this day. In the twentieth century, when blacks 
had been largely disenfranchised, section 269 w a s 
amended to authorize the imposition of other property 
taxes for education, subject to a referendum requirement. 
The net effect of those subsequent amendments is that the 
effective millage cap on local property taxes for education 
is now 15 mills. 
The millage caps were of particular importance in 
the Black Belt region, where whites owned virtually all 
the land, but where the large majority of the school age 
children were black. (App.716a-18a). Those ownership and 
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demographic patterns persist. "While blacks accounted 
for 26.35% of the State's total population in 2009, they 
owned only about 3% of Alabama's agricultural acreage 
and 2 % of its timber acreage." (App.933a). "In Marengo, 
Lowndes, and Wilcox counties [in the Black Belt], black 
agricultural acreage ownership was so low in 2007 that 
the United States Department of Agriculture declined to 
release black agricultural acreage ownership data in order 
'to avoid disclosing data for individual farms,' yet blacks 
constituted a majority of the population in each of those 
counties in 2009." (App.934a-35a)(quoting PX493). A n d 
in the Black Belt counties1, partially as a result of white 
flight from the public schools following desegregation, the 
county school systems are overwhelmingly black. In six of 
the twelve Black Belt counties the county school system 
is over 98% black, and in three of those counties there 
are fewer than 10 white students in the school system. 
(PX424; App.932a-25a). 
T h e 1971 and 1978 Constitutional Limits on 
Property Assessments 
Property assessments in Alabama have long been 
tainted by racial discrimination. For a time during 
Reconstruction, "[u]nder Republican taxation, 'all 
property of every description' was taxed by applying 
a millage rate to the property's assessed, fair market 
value." (App.699a). "[A]ll of a sudden African-American 
tax assessors in the Black Belt are beginning to assess . 
. . land at its real value, not at th[el artificially low value 
1. The Black Belt counties are Barbour, Bullock, Dallas, 
Greene, Hale, Lowndes, Macon, Marengo, Perry, Pickens, Sumter 
and Wilcox Counties. (App.l23a). 
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of 1865." (App.700a n. 1014)(quoting 1 Tr. 87). At the 1875 
Convention, however," [white] delegates from the Black 
Belt, where blacks retained an overwhelming numerical 
majority of the population, and still held some of the local 
offices, especially feared the black tax assessor w h o had 
the legal ability to appraise property at a figure 'injurious 
to the economic interest of planters': i.e., at a monetary 
value that was actually close to the property's fair and 
reasonable value." (App.716a)(quoting 1 Tr. 89). Following 
1875, "[w]ith tax officials loyal to the Democratic Party, 
'the whites in the Black Belt were able to maintain very 
low assessments of property.' Land began to be assessed 
at much lower values than during Reconstruction, and 
some parcels escaped taxation altogether." (App.732a-33a) 
(quoting Norrell Tr., 40). 
In many counties ample funds for the white schools 
were obtained by diverting state funding that should have 
been used for the black schools; with the needs of the 
white schools already met in this way, low assessment of 
white-owned land assured that local taxes did not end up 
being spent on the impecunious black schools. This system 
was facilitated by a provision of the 1901 Constitution 
that permitted local officials to divert to white schools 
funds they received from the state based in part on the 
number of black students in the system. The district 
court found that "what the [school] boards uniformly did 
was disproportionately spend available revenues on the 
education of white children at the expense of education of 
black children. The result was the collection of property 
taxes for the education of all school-age children, both white 
and black, but allocation of an overwhelming proportion of 
that revenue for the benefit of white children." (App.746a). 
"[W]hite schools in the Black Belt were now getting all the 
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money they need because the money is coming to them in 
terms of... the total population, both white and black, but 
effectively it's being spent almost all on the white students. 
A n d that's a very small percentage, a fifth, a sixth, to even 
an eighth of the population in some of these counties." 
(App.749a n. 1147)(quoting 1 Tr. 159-60). "[W]hite schools 
located in the areas with a large black population—and 
especially in the Black Belt, where whites constitute as 
little as an eighth of the total population—were extremely 
well funded. Accordingly, the Black Belt counties had no 
incentive to seek further sources of revenue for education." 
(App.748a-49a). 
T h e district court concluded that up until 1971 
"county tax assessors consistently undervalued property, 
particularly in rural areas, and primarily to prevent 
adequate funding for black schools." (App.l015a)(emphasis 
added). The pattern of racially-motivated low property 
assessments identified by the district court was possible 
because under state law county assessors in practice 
wielded standardless discretion to assign whatever value 
they pleased to a piece of property. 
In June 1971 that system of standardless discretion 
was held unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to race. 
Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F.Supp. 615 ( M . D . Ala. 1971) 
(three judge court). At the time of the Weissinger decision, 
essentially all property in Alabama was assessed at less 
than its fair market value, but the ratio of assessed value 
to fair market value varied widely from county to county. 
That ratio ranged from a low of 6.7% in Hale County 
(a Black Belt county) to a high of 26.8% in Jefferson 
County (which includes Birmingham). Rural property 
was assessed at an average ratio (12.1%) lower than 
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property in urban areas (19.4%); the average statewide 
ratio for all property was 16.9%. 330 F.Supp. at 625. The 
court in Weissinger held that this variation in assessment 
ratios violated Equal Protection, and directed county tax 
officials (absent some other solution by the state) to use 
a 60% ratio. 
The order in Weissinger had the predictable effect of 
forcing the Alabama Legislature to act. Unless the state 
adopted some corrective measure of its own, the average 
assessment ratio would have risen from 16.9% to 60%, 
almost quadrupling the average property tax bill The 
state could have addressed the immediate problem with 
a relatively modest temporary measure; one proposal 
would have required each county to temporarily reduce its 
millage rate to the level at which its total revenue (based on 
the court-mandated ratio of 60%) would remain the same 
as in the previous year. (PX55, at 9-11). Rural interests 
favored a classification system, under which farms or 
timberland would be assessed with a different ratio than 
commercial land. That could have been accomplished by 
amending the state constitution to permit different ratios, 
and then establishing by statute a lower ratio for farms 
and timberland (e.g., 40%) than the 60% ratio otherwise 
mandated by state law. These more limited responses 
would have solved the problem created by the Weissinger 
decision without materially limiting the ability of counties 
and cities to use property taxes for the public schools. 
In the fall of 1971, however, Governor Wallace and 
most white Alabama officials were incensed by federally 
ordered desegregation of the Alabama public schools 
(which received a majority of property tax revenues), 
large numbers of white students were fleeing the newly 
10 
integrated schools, and it was widely feared that black 
voters, increasingly enfranchised by the Voting Rights 
Act, would in time elect local officials, particularly in 
the majority-black Black Belt region of the state. (See 
App.869a-882a). A chairman of the state Democratic Party 
had earlier warned that "if you had a nigger tax assessor," 
he would increase the assessments of white-owned land. 
The district court found that this "fear of an African-
American tax assessor was not unique . . . ; nearly all 
white Alabamians who owned large tracts of agricultural 
or timberland shared it." (App.869a)(quoting 2 Tr. 24-25). 
The Legislature chose to respond to the problem 
created by Weissinger by selecting measures that 
sharply reduced the ability of future local officials to 
raise revenues through property taxes. It adopted a 
constitutional amendment that not only established a 
classification system in the constitution itself, but also set 
specific ratios at low levels intended (on average) to freeze 
assessments close to the levels at which they had been set 
prior to Weissinger. Under Amendmen t 325, commercial 
property was to be assessed at 25% of its fair market value, 
while farms, timberland and residential property were to 
be assessed at 15% of their fair market values. (App.430a). 
A m e n d m e n t 325 permitted different ratios to be utilized 
in individual counties, but only the state legislature—not 
the counties themselves—were authorized to adopt such 
variations. 
In 1978 the Legislature approved A m e n d m e n t 373, 
which reduced even further the assessed value of property, 
and constrained in new ways the authority of local tax 
assessors and county officials. 
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First, Amendment 373 lowered the assessment ratios 
to 20% for commercial property and 10% for agricultural 
property, timberland, and single family residences. 
Second, recognizing that the ratio reduction and other 
provisions of Amendment 373 could well reduce current 
and future tax revenues, the A m e n d m e n t authorized 
counties and cities to increase their millage rates above 
the limits provided in the state Constitution if anticipated 
tax receipts under Amendment 373 were less than 120% 
of the tax receipts for 1977-78. The authority to do so, 
however, expressly expired in September 1979 (or if 
revenues were lower than anticipated, in September 
1980). Prior to 1981, white officials still controlled the 
county commissions in all but a single county in Alabama, 
but it was obvious to all that this was about to change; 
between 1980 and 1985, after this special provision had 
expired, blacks were elected to a majority of the county 
commissions in five Black Belt counties. (PX350, 351). 
Third, and most importantly, A m e n d m e n t 373 
accorded owners of agricultural property and timberland 
the option of having their property assessed (prior 
to the application of the 10% ratio) based on "current 
use valuation," and empowered the state legislature to 
establish a statutory method for fixing that valuation, 
effectively displacing county assessors from their 
longstanding exclusive authority to determine the value 
of such property. This was, as the district court held, 
"[t]he most fundamental change in preexisting law wrought 
by Amendmen t 373." (App.98a). In Alabama today more 
than 60% of all land is now valued under the "statutory 
method" established by the legislature for assessing 
agricultural land and timberland, rather than based on 
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fair market value determined by the county tax assessor, 
(PX387). In the Black Belt counties the figure is even 
higher; in six of those counties over 80% of the land is 
assessed under the statutory formula fixed by the state 
legislature, rather than the actual fair market value 
determined by the county assessor. (Id.). Today there are 
black tax assessors in most of the Black Belt counties; 
but because of Amendmen t 373, it is the state legislature, 
not those elected assessors, which actually determines 
the assessment of most of the farms and timberland— 
virtually all of it still white-owned—in those and all other 
counties. 
The complex formulas established by the legislature 
under A m e n d m e n t 373 generally assign to agricultural 
land and timberland values far below their fair market 
value; on average that land is assessed at 27.4% of its 
actual value. (PX387, line 69). The average fair market 
value of that land is $1,679 per acre; the average value 
assigned per acre under the statutory method is only 
$461. (Id.). The assessed value of that acre, applying the 
10% ratio, is only $46.12. The m a x i m u m permissible local 
property tax for the support of public schools, applying 
the 15 mill cap, is a mere 69 cents.2 A $1 million farm or 
timber plantation would under the statutory method thus 
be valued on average at about $274,000, have an assessed 
value of $27,400, and be subject to a m a x i m u m tax for the 
support of the public schools of a paltry $411. 
2. "[P]roperty tax revenues from timber lands, which 
constitute seventy-one percent of Alabama's geographic land 
mass, average less than $1.00 per acre and account for only two 
percent of all property tax revenue." Knight v. Alabama, 458 
F.Supp.2d at 1298. 
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PROCEEDINGS B E L O W 
The millage caps of the 1901 Constitution and the 
assessment provisions of Amendments 325 and 373 were 
first challenged in Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp,2d 
1273 (N.D.Al??a. 2004). Knight was a continuation of 
longstanding litigation regarding the desegregation of 
the Alabama institutions of higher education. The district 
court in Knight found that both the millage caps and 
the assessment provisions amendments were racially 
motivated; it concluded, however, that relief for those 
constitutional violations was not within the scope of the 
higher education claim in Knight 458 F.Supp.2d at 1312. 
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on that ground. 476 F.3d 
1219, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007), cert denied, 551 U . S . 1146 
(2007). 
The instant action was filed shortly thereafter. The 
plaintiffs argued that the state defendants were bound by 
the finding in Knight that all of the challenged provisions 
were racially motivated. The district judge, however, 
decided to retry the issues that had been litigated in 
Knight Most of the facts bearing on the plaintiffs' 
constitutional claims in both cases are not in dispute, 
and are detailed in the two district court opinions. The 
determination of the plaintiffs' claims turns largely on 
disputes about the controlling legal standards. 
The district court below concluded, as had the 
district court in Knight, that the millage caps in the 1901 
Constitution were motivated by racial discrimination. 
(App.1019a). The district court held, however, that proof of 
an invidious motive is insufficient to establish a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause; the court insisted that 
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the plaintiffs were also required to show that the millage 
caps had injured black public school students more than 
they had injured white pubic school students. The court 
concluded that the racially-motivated millage caps, 
although harmful to the black plaintiffs in this case, 
were equally harmful to white children, and thus were 
constitutional. (App.l029a). The district court rejected 
the challenge to Amendments 325 and 373, holding that 
those amendments had been enacted in order to avoid the 
tax increases that would otherwise have resulted from the 
Weissinger decision. (App.l019a-20a). Although finding 
that the artificially low pre-Weissinger tax assessments 
were "primarily" motivated by race, the district court 
held that under Eleventh Circuit precedent the deliberate 
perpetuation of those race-based assessment levels by 
A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 was not unconstitutional. 
(App.1015a). 
The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds the 
rejection of plaintiffs' challenge to the 1901 Constitution. 
It held that the black plaintiffs lacked standing to 
challenge the race-based millage caps because they 
could not show that officials in the counties where they 
lived would necessarily choose to increase the millage 
rates if the caps were set aside. (App.11a-13a). With 
regard to Amendments 325 and 373, the court of appeals 
rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the district court had 
applied the wrong legal standards in evaluating their 
intent claim and plaintiffs' claim that the amendments 
unconstitutionally perpetuated the pre-Weissinger 
discriminatory assessments. (App.24a). 
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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION 
This is one of the rare cases in which the lower 
courts' departure from the legal standards established 
by decisions of this Court is of such extraordinary 
importance as to warrant review by this Court. T h e 
Alabama constitutional restrictions at issue have with 
cruel effectiveness resulted in "a shamefully neglected and 
grossly underfunded public school system." (App.631a). 
The court of appeals rejected the challenge to the 
racially motivated millage caps on the ground that this 
type of violation—adopted for the purpose of preventing 
future elected officials from taxing white-owned land in 
order to educate black as well as white students— is one 
which under Article III the federal courts are powerless 
to redress. The challenge to the assessment restrictions 
failed, in part, because it was resolved by Judge Smith 
in the instant case, rather than by Judge Murphy, w h o 
decided Knight The consequences of this litigation for tens 
of thousands of current Alabama public school children, 
and for countless others in the years ahead, are simply 
too great to rest on such grounds. These are not problems 
which can be addressed through the normal democratic 
process; the very purpose of the Alabama constitutional 
restrictions was to strip local elected officials of the legal 
authority to impose the property taxes needed to support 
the public schools. 
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I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT 
BLACK CHILDREN A N D PARENTS LACK 
STANDING TO C H A L L E N G E RACIALLY 
MOTIVATED PROPERTY TAX RESTRICTIONS 
IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE DECISIONS OF 
THIS COURT 
The district court concluded that the millage caps in 
the 1901 Constitution were adopted for the purpose of 
limiting the extent to which property taxes could be used 
to pay for the education of black children. The court of 
appeals did not question the correctness of that finding. It 
concluded, however, that black children and their parents 
lack standing to challenge this type of constitutional 
violation. 
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that black plaintiffs 
lack standing because, even if the millage caps were struck 
down, there could be no increase in property taxes—and 
thus no increase in school funding—unless local officials 
subsequently chose to adopt ordinances, or the state later 
opted to enact statutes, which increased the millage rate. 
"[I]t is undisputed that further legislation is necessary 
to achieve higher millage rates, and 'the contingency of 
[legislative] action makes the redress of plaintiffs' injury 
. . . speculative.'.... The Alabama Legislature (and the 
people of Alabama) may choose to maintain the status quo 
or lower the rates, and w e can only guess as to whether 
the removal of the current millage caps will redress the 
plaintiffs' injury," (App.11a)(quoting Medina v. Clinton, 
86 F.3d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1996)). The court of appeals 
refused to engage in "guesswork as to how independent 
decisionmakers"—e.g., the county commissioners 
otherwise empowered to increase millage rates—"will 
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exercise their judgment." (Id.)(quoting Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int'l. 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013)). The 1875 and 
1901 Constitutions structured the governmental process 
so that individuals who favor millage rates over certain 
levels were required to obtain an amendmen t to the 
state constitution. The Eleventh Circuit insisted that the 
structuring of government to create such a legal barrier 
does not by itself inflict a cognizable injury. (App.l2a-
13a). The existence of such barriers, it held, even if "put 
in place for a discriminatory purpose, is not sufficient, 
in and of itself, to confer standing." (App.l3a). Under the 
Eleventh Circuit standard, a plaintiff could have standing 
only if there had been a pre-1875 millage rate in some 
county which exceeded the current caps, and which had 
not been repealed in the intervening 139 years; in that 
unlikely situation invalidation of the caps would bring 
the pre-existing rate back into force. But a restriction 
that operates prospectively cannot give rise to standing, 
the Eleventh Circuit insisted, because a court m a y not 
"guess" what future state or local officials would do if the 
restriction were removed. 
T h e Eleventh Circuit's decision is inconsistent 
with a series of decisions of this Court holding that the 
creation of a prospective barrier to obtaining favorable 
government action creates a cognizable injury. In 
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U . S . 385 (1969), this Court held 
unconstitutional a city charter provision which required 
that any ordinance related to housing discrimination be 
approved by referendum. The invalidated requirement 
"not only suspended the operation of [a]n existing 
ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also 
required the approval of the electors before any future 
ordinance could take effect." 393 U . S . at 389-90. Hunter 
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emphasized that it did not hold that the "mere repeal of 
an existing [antidiscrimination] ordinance violates the 
Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t " 393 U . S . at 390 n. 5. Crawford 
v. Board of Ed. of Los Angeles, 458 U . S . 527 (1982), made 
clear that the constitutional violation and cognizable 
injury in such cases is the barrier to future governmental 
action, not any repeal of a pre-existing measure. The 
provision at issue in Crawford eliminated the state law 
obligation of school boards to use busing for the purpose 
of desegregation, but left local school officials free to 
engage in such measures in the future. The Court held 
that the "the Equal Protection Clause is not violated 
by mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies." 
458 U . S . at 538. Crawford explained that Hunter was 
distinguishable because it "involved more than a 'mere 
repeal' of the fair housing ordinance: persons seeking 
anti-discrimination housing laws—presumptively racial 
minorities—were 'singled out for mandatory referendums 
while no other group.. . face[d] that obstacle.'" 458 U . S . at 
541 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U . S . 137, 142 (1971)) 
(emphasis added). Washington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, 458 U . S . 457 (1982), struck down an initiative which 
operated prospectively to forbid school boards to assign 
students to a non-neighborhood school for the purpose 
of desegregation. Although the initiative also had the 
effect of repealing a busing plan that had earlier been 
adopted in the city of Seattle, the Court made clear that 
it was the prospective restructuring of the government 
process, not that repeal, which violated Equal Protection. 
"Our analysis . . . has nothing to do with whether school 
board action predates that taken by the State. Instead, 
what w e find objectionable about [the] Initiative . . . is the 
comparative burden it imposes on minority participation 
in the political process." 458 U . S . at 480 n.23. "[The] 
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[initiative . . . works something more than the 'mere 
repeal' of a desegregation law by the political entity that 
created it. It burdens all future attempts to integrate 
Washington schools in districts throughout the State, by 
lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a 
new and remote level of government." 458 U . S . at 483. 
The Eleventh Circuit held that the millage caps, 
which obstruct "all future attempts" of the plaintiffs 
to obtain school property tax rates over those caps, 
create no cognizable injury, because a court could only 
speculate about whether those efforts would succeed in 
the absence of the caps. But this is precisely the type 
of injury deemed cognizable in Hunter, Crawford, and 
Washington. This Court did not require the plaintiffs in 
Hunter to demonstrate the likelihood that Akron would 
in the future adopt housing nondiscrimination ordinances. 
Similarly, Romer v . Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), did not 
demand that the plaintiffs in that case prove that—but for 
the constitutional amendment there at issue—Colorado 
officials would in the future adopt new measures designed 
to forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
In the instant case, the court of appeals acknowledged that 
the millage caps were "impediments to public education 
funding arising from . . . state laws." (App.7a). Under 
the decisions of this Court, the existence of such an 
impediment that "made it substantially more difficult to 
secure the enactment of ordinances" is sufficient by itself 
to establish standing. Hunter, 393 U . S . at 390. 
The court of appeals also argued that, even if it were 
certain that county officials would adopt millage rates over 
the caps if those caps were held unconstitutional, the black 
plaintiffs in this particular case would still lack standing, 
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because they could not prove that those increases would 
also be approved by voters at a referendum. The Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that because voters in two earlier 
referenda had rejected millage increases in Sumter 
and Lawrence Counties, "an injunction prohibiting 
enforcement of the millage caps will not likely redress 
the plaintiffs' injury," (App. 12a). But Hunter, Washington 
and Romer do not require a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that he or she is "likely" to obtain favorable government 
action—from government officials or as a result of 
a referendum— if an unconstitutional impediment is 
removed. A n d standing assuredly should not depend on 
judicial predictions about the results of future referenda. 
In this case the Lawrence County referendum on which 
the Eleventh Circuit relied was held 24 years ago, and the 
voters then divided along racial lines.3 The Sumter County 
referendum was marred by "informal communications 
[that] threatened black voters, m a n y of w h o m did not own 
their homes, with increases in their rents and even loss of 
their jobs."4 It would be unsound, and indeed unseemly, 
for the federal judges to deny standing to black plaintiffs 
on the assumption that such racial differences will forever 
guarantee the defeat of property tax referenda. 
3. Affidavit of Dwayne Key, Exhibit B . In the majority white 
precincts only 37.8 % of the voters favored the increase, while in 
the majority black precincts 60.8% of the votes were in favor. 
4. Affidavit of Bobby Singleton, at 5. 
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II. THE L O W E R COURTS' REJECTION OF 
T H E INTENT-BASED C H A L L E N G E TO 
A M E N D M E N T S 325 A N D 373 RESTS ON 
STANDARDS THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
This is the second lawsuit challenging as racially 
motivated the assessment restrictions in Amendments 325 
and 373. In Knight v. Alabama in 2004, Judge Murphy 
found that these restrictions on the ability of local officials 
to assess property were racially motivated. W h e n relief 
for that violation was denied in Knight on other grounds, 
the instant action was filed asserting the same claims. In 
2011 Judge Smith concluded that Amendments 325 and 373 
had been adopted to avoid the sharp increase in property 
taxes threatened by Weissinger. 
The intent-based challenge in the instant case to 
the restrictions in Amendments 325 and 373 is the same 
as the claim adjudicated in Knight The plaintiffs in the 
two cases relied on testimony from the same historical 
experts and the same economist. The entire record of 
the trial in Knight was placed in evidence in the instant 
case. The same attorney was the lead trial counsel for 
plaintiffs in both cases, as was a principal trial attorney 
for the defendants. The lead plaintiff in Knight was a 
key witness in this case. In the instant case Judge Smith 
repeatedly relied on evidence from Knight and quoted 
Judge Murphy's opinion in that case. Almost all of the 
subsidiary facts in the two cases were undisputed, and the 
description of those circumstances in the 2004 and 2011 
opinions are entirely consistent. The differing outcomes 
of the two trials of these intent claims occurred because 
Judge Smith in his 2011 decision applied different legal 
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standards than did Judge Murphy in his 2004 opinion. 
The standards applied in the instant case were in several 
critical respects inconsistent with the Equal Protection 
standards established by decisions of this Court. 
(1) Judge Smith and Judge M u r p h y framed in 
significantly different manners the question that 
controlled the outcome of these claims. In his 2011 opinion 
Judge Smith concluded that Amendments 325 and 373 
were required to solve the problem created by Weissinger. 
O n the other hand, Judge Murphy in 2004 determined 
that particular aspects of those Amendments, the specific 
solutions selected to solve the Weissinger problem, were 
framed for racial reasons. The difference between those 
questions was of dispositive importance. 
Judge Smith believed that the rejection of plaintiffs' 
intent claim was required by the fact that Amendments 
325 and 373 were prompted by the need to address the 
crisis created by Weissinger. "Amendments 325 and 373 . 
. . were a reaction to the increases in property appraisals 
and assessments mandated by the Weissinger decision, 
and the accompanying threat of a tremendous increase In 
the property taxes paid by large landowners." (App.1015a). 
"Amendment 373 . . . was enacted with the support of the 
Farm Bureau, and it is clear that the Bureau still was 
intent on ensuring that the wealthy owners of large tracts 
of farm properties and timber lands would not experience 
a significant tax increase. The much delayed Weissinger 
deadline loomed large on the economic horizon of the 
large landowners, and it became clear that Amendment 
325 was not sufficient to stifle the impending tax burden." 
(App.1013a). The "force motivating the adoption of 
A m e n d m e n t [was] the Alabama F a r m Bureau. The 
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F a r m Bureau, representing the interests of Black Belt 
Planters and other, extremely-large landholders, w a s 
especially keen to see some form of property tax relief 
passed in the wake of the Weissinger decision. Otherwise, 
its constituents would face enormous ad valorem tax 
increases . . . . " (App.1008a)(emphasis added). 
Judge Murphy's 2004 opinion, on the other hand, 
focused more specifically on why the legislature selected the 
particular solutions to the Weissinger problem, solutions 
which drastically limited the authority of local officials. 
"[A]ll tax policy made or revised in the 20th century has 
effectively been made to conform with the commitments 
of taxation capped by constitutional mandate, reinforced 
by limits on local control, local authority to tax, and that 
of course was the result of fears, especially among Black 
Belt counties, that in the future some reenfranchised black 
electorate would raise property taxes." 458 F.Supp.2d at 
1296 (emphasis added). "Black Belt and urban industrial 
interests successfully used the argument that it is unfair 
for white property owners to pay for the education of 
blacks to produce all the state constitutional barriers to 
property taxes from 1875 to the present, including the 
1971 and 1978 . . . amendments." Knight v. Alabama, 458 
F.Supp. 2d at 1297 (emphasis added). 
It is of controlling importance whether the 
constitutional challenge turns on the motive for responding 
at all to Weissinger, or is determined more specifically 
by what motivated the legislature to respond in a way 
that not only would avoid immediate tax increases (thus 
solving the Weissinger problem), but also would create 
"limits on local control" and "barriers" to future taxes. In 
the absence of legislative action, the Weissinger decision 
24 
meant that property taxes would quadruple in 1972. But 
while the need to respond to Weissinger explains why 
the Legislature adopted some solution to the problem, it 
does not explain w h y the Legislature did so by imposing 
the disputed "limits" and "barriers." The Weissinger 
problem could have been solved by a proposal before 
the legislature that would have "provided for a one-time 
millage adjustment at the local level to insure that taxes 
would not be increased through equalization." (PX55 
at 9-11). A different level of assessments for farms and 
timberland than for commercial property could have been 
achieved simply by providing a lower ratio (e.g., 40%) 
for farms and timberland than the 60% ratio that would 
have applied to other property. Either of these solutions 
would have left unencumbered the ability of future county 
officials to levy the property taxes needed for schools. 
But the legislature instead chose to solve the 
Weissinger problem in a manner that severely limited 
that local authority. First, both amendments went beyond 
providing different ratios for different types of land to 
constitutionally mandate extremely low ratios. Second, 
A m e n d m e n t 373 authorized the legislature to regulate 
the assessment of farms and timberland by establishing 
a legislative formula for calculating so-called "current use 
value," effectively restructuring Alabama government in 
a way that transferred to the legislature the assessment 
authority that prior to 1978 had been the exclusive 
province of county assessors. Third, although Amendment 
373 gave county commissioners who wanted to maintain or 
even increase revenues by up to 20% the authority to raise 
millage rates above the constitutional caps if necessary 
to do so in light of the lowered assessments, it limited 
that power to commissioners who were in office prior to 
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October 1980, a time when whites remained in control of 
66 of the 67 county commissions in Alabama. (PX135). 
Landowners could have been protected from large tax 
increases without taking any of these specific steps, and 
nothing in Judge Smith's 2011 opinion purports to address 
w h y those prospective restrictions were chosen over other 
approaches that would not have hamstrung future county 
officials. 
Judge Smith's 2011 o w n opinion contains a number 
of subsidiary findings that would readily explain these 
prospective restrictions: fear of the future election 
of black county officials5 and animus toward support 
for the n o w integrated schools6 which whites, at the 
urging of Governor Wallace, were fleeing in favor of 
private, segregated academies.7 Judge M u r p h y relied 
on precisely these very circumstances in concluding that 
the prospective restrictions on assessments were racially 
motivated. But because Judge Smith mistakenly focused 
on w h y the legislature had decided to solve the Weissinger 
problem at all, rather than inquiring into the motives for 
the particular solutions selected, those circumstances 
were to him irrelevant. 
This central premise of Judge Smith's decision is 
inconsistent with the decisions of this Court. Even where 
the overall goal of a law is itself entirely legitimate, the 
legislature m a y not rely on race in selecting the manner 
in which that goal will be achieved. For example, although 
5. App.866a, 868a-69a, 881a. 
6. App.845a-46a, 870a-71a, 874a-75a, 877a-80a, 1049a. 
7. App.859a-61a, 871a and n. 1478. 
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states every decade adopt new districting plans because 
of demographic changes, and sometimes because of an 
increase or decrease in the number of congressional 
seats to which they are entitled, this Court has held 
that the Equal Protection Clause could be violated if the 
boundaries of a particular district were race-based. Shaw 
v. Reno, 509 U . S . 630 (1993). Under this Court's decisions 
the controlling question here is w h y the legislature, after 
deciding to avoid the sharp increase in overall taxes that 
would have occurred under Weissinger, selected as the 
method of doing so a scheme which stripped county and 
city officials of the ability to tax the vast majority of the 
actual value of local property. The fatal flaw of the decision 
below is not that it decided this issue incorrectly, but that 
it did not decide this issue at all. 
(2) Judge Smith believed that plaintiffs were required 
to prove a racial motive, not only behind the action of the 
legislature, but also in the public vote to ratify each of 
the disputed amendments. "[I]t must be shown that those 
amendments were drafted by their sponsors, adopted by 
the State Legislature, and ratified by the citizens because 
of their racially adverse effects." (App.1002a)(emphasis 
added and omitted). "[R]acially-discriminatory intent 
must have been a 'substantial' or 'motivating,' factor 
in each step of the process." (App.l002a-03a)(emphasis 
added). 
That legal standard was of decisive importance in this 
case. The voters themselves had no role in selecting the 
particular solutions embodied in Amendments 325 and 
373; thus the voters could not be said to have made race-
based decisions regarding the selection of those aspects 
of the amendments. A n d the public was never given the 
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option of voting for a plan that would have avoided large 
tax increases without limiting future local control of 
property tax revenues. The legislature structured the 
referendum on Amendment 325 in a manner that forced 
voters to approve the A m e n d m e n t regardless of those 
restrictions. "Because a defeat of Amendmen t 325 would 
result in statewide application of the backup-bill's thirty 
percent assessment ratio, a 'no' vote was essentially a 
vote for a thirty percent ratio on homes, while proposed 
Amendmen t 325 called for a fifteen percent assessment 
ratio. O n e commentator highlighted the 'quandary' 
presented to the electorate in this way: ' " D o you think 
I'm a nut?" a voter may mull. "Thirty per cent is double 
15 percent, and I'm paying too much tax already. W h o 
would vote for 30 percent?"' (App.902a)(quoting PX223 , 
at 2). "[T]he packaging of the amendment and the back-
up bill essentially left the voter with only one choice." 
(App.903a-04a). 
This Court's decisions emphatically do not require 
proof that an improper motive (with regard to an entire 
enactment or some aspect of it) was present "in each 
step" of the decisionmaking process. The controlling 
question is whether the provision at issue would not 
have been adopted but for that impermissible purpose. 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U . S . 252, 271 n. 21 (1977). In a 
bicameral legislature, one body might include a provision 
for an invidious reason, while the other body then passed 
the entire proposal simply because it wanted to adjourn 
for the summer recess. A n improper motive that existed 
at only a single part of a multi-step process could still 
be the but-for cause of the final provision. See Staub v. 
Proctor Hospital, 131 S.Ct 1186 (2011). Thus, for example, 
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if in this case the legislature for racial reasons limited 
the A m e n d m e n t 373 cap-disregard provision to county 
commissioners in office prior to November 1980, and the 
public then approved A m e n d m e n t 373 simply because 
it lowered the assessment ratio for private homes from 
15% to 10%, race would still be the but-for cause of that 
November 1980 cutoff. 
III. THE L O W E R COURTS' REJECTION OF THE 
CLAIM THAT A M E N D M E N T S 325 A N D 373 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY PERPETUATE PRIOR 
DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES RESTS ON A 
STANDARD THAT IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT 
The courts below held that Alabama did not violate 
Equal Protection by deliberately perpetuating race-based 
pre-1971 assessment levels. The district court findings 
squarely presented this issue. That court concluded 
that prior to 1971 "county tax assessors consistently 
undervalued property, particularly in rural areas, 
and primarily to prevent adequate funding for black 
schools." (App.l015a)(emphasis added). Through the 
adoption of Amendments 325 and 373, "Alabama chose 
to entrench its historically low property assessments into 
the Constitution . . . ." (App.24a)(quoting brief for state); 
see Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1295 ("the 
Legislature further . . . amend[ed] the state constitution 
to preserve the status quo of historically low property 
taxes."). The district court opinion detailed the repeated 
and ultimately successful efforts to enact state measures 
that would perpetuate the pre-Weissinger primarily 
race-based assessment levels. (App.887a-88a, 891a-93a, 
1012a-13a). "The challenged provisions of the Alabama 
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Constitution, particularly the 'current use' and 'lid bill' 
aspects added to the State's organic law by Amendments 
325 and 373, arguably are a continuation in practical, but 
not in legal, terms of the . . . period . . . when county tax 
assessors undervalued property . . . primarily to prevent 
adequate funding for black schools." (App.1015a). 
The district court clearly understood the plaintiffs 
to claim that the deliberate perpetuation of the 
racially motivated pre-Weissinger assessments was 
unconstitutional. "[P]laintiff's challenge is . . . that the 
system created in response to the mandate in Weissinger 
I is unconstitutional because it was devised as a means of 
perpetuating, as much as possible, the same anemic ad 
valorem tax revenues generated by a system that had 
been devised with the racially discriminatory intent of 
minimizing monies available for the education of black 
children." (App.464a). 
The district court concluded, however, that rejection 
of this perpetuation claim was mandated by the Eleventh 
Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 
F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. 
Johnson v. Bush, 546 U . S . 1015 (2005). 
In Johnson the court addressed a felony 
disenfranchisement provision enacted in Florida 
in 1968 that was based upon a predecessor 
provision enacted in 1868—a predecessor that 
the court assumed, for purposes of argument, 
to have been motivated by racial animus. . . . 
[T]he challenged provision was held to be 
"constitutional because it was substantively 
altered and reenacted in 1968 in the absence 
of any evidence of racial bias." 
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(App.616a)(quoting Johnson)(emphasis added). Applying 
the reasoning of that Eleventh Circuit decision, the district 
court held that it was constitutional for Amendments 
325 and 373 to intentionally perpetuate the race-based 
pre-Weissinger assessments, because the Amendments 
deliberately perpetuated those earlier constitutional 
violations through a method that "substantively altered" 
the original scheme. 
Amendments 325 and 373 undoubtedly were 
devised for the purpose of avoiding the dramatic 
changes in Alabama's property tax structure 
portended by the decision of a three-judge 
federal court in Weissinger.... Even so, there 
is little doubt that each of those Amendments 
'substantively altered' the property tax 
assessment scheme that precipitated the 
decision. Thus, Johnson indicates that this 
court must determine whether... Amendments 
325 and 373 were "motivated by a desire to 
discriminate against blacks on account of race 
...." Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U . S . at 233.... 
(App.617a). A m e n d m e n t s 325 and 373 "substantively 
altered" the pre-Weissinger system because they 
achieved roughly the same result, not (as was the practice 
before Weissinger) through individualized discretionary 
assessments of particular plots of land, but by creating 
ratios and formulas specifically devised to result in the 
same overall exceedingly low level of assessments. The 
district court held that the deliberate perpetuation 
of the pre-Weissinger race-based assessment levels 
was constitutional because it had been achieved in a 
manner that involved a "substantive[] alter[ation]" of the 
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earlier method. (App.1015a-16a). The court of appeals 
rejected without explanation plaintiffs' argument that 
Amendments 325 and 373 unconstitutionally perpetuated 
earlier discrimination. 
This "substantively altered" standard is clearly 
inconsistent with this Court's decisions regarding 
government practices that perpetuate the effect of 
previous discrimination. Following this Court's decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U . S . 483 
(1954), southern states adopted a number of different 
student plans that "substantively altered" the race-
based assignments held impermissible in Brown. In 
Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of the City of Jackson, 391 
U . S . 450 (1968), the school board assigned all students 
without regard to race to their neighborhood schools, 
but gave them the option of transferring back to the 
schools to which they had once been assigned on the 
basis of race. In Green v. County School Board of New 
Kent County, 391 U . S . 430 (1968), the board adopted a 
"freedom of choice" plan, which permitted students to 
attend whichever school they selected. This Court held 
both plans unconstitutional, because as a practical matter 
they resulted in the same racial attendance patterns that 
had existed prior to Brown. In Myers v. Anderson, 238 
U . S . 368 (1915), Annapolis limited the franchise to city 
taxpayers with at least $500 in assessed property, but 
exempted from that requirement male descendants of 
any person eligible to vote prior to 1868 in Maryland or 
any other state. This system "substantively altered" pre-
1868 laws that prohibited blacks from voting; blacks could 
vote if they had the requisite property, or if they were 
descendants of persons who prior to 1868 lived in states 
where blacks could vote. This Court nonetheless held that 
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so-called "grandfather clause" unconstitutional because it 
perpetuated, albeit in an altered form, the effects of prior 
discriminatory registration requirements. 
IV. THIS CASE P R E S E N T S ISSUES OF 
EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE 
The truly exceptional practical importance of the 
issues and claims in this case weighs heavily in favor of 
review by this Court. "The effect of low property tax 
revenues has had a crippling effect on poor, majority 
black school districts In rural areas of the state, most 
local school districts simply do not have a critical mass of 
valuable commercial property and residential homes—the 
two types of property shouldering eighty-five percent of 
the property taxes—to raise adequate funds for public 
education." Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1299. 
[R]acism, and the resulting determination to 
maintain the politics of "white supremacy" 
at all costs, has obstructed educational 
progress in Alabama since the Civil W a r . The 
result has been a shamefully neglected and 
grossly underfunded public school system.... 
[N]o group has historically suffered more from 
Alabama's lack of an equitable and adequate 
public school system than African-Americans 
?? ?? ?? ?? 
(App.631a). "Alabama's per capita property tax and 
revenues are the lowest of all fifty states—the State 
collects only $250 in property taxes per person— Florida 
collected almost four times more, while Georgia collected 
almost three times more property taxes per person than 
Alabama." Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1297. 
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A l a b a m a continues to be plagued by an 
inadequately funded public school system— 
one that hinders the upward mobility of her 
citizens, black and white alike, especially in 
rural counties [As a result,] [t]he children of 
the rural poor, whether black or white, are left 
to struggle as best as they can in underfunded, 
dilapidated schools. 
(App.l044a). Amendments 325 and 373, "by constitutionally 
keeping the property tax base at a mere fraction of the 
property's value, guarantee[] that no level of millage rates 
will produce minimally adequate property taxes." Knight 
v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1298. Black Belt counties 
often do not have sufficient funds to provide their students 
with text books.8 
This woefully inadequate funding is not the choice 
of the elected officials in the Black Belt; the repeated 
restructuring of Alabama government has left those 
officials with no real ability to raise sufficient property 
tax revenues. W h e n local funding for public schools is 
inadequate, ordinarily "the ultimate solutions must come 
from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures 
of those w h o elect them." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U . S . 1, 59-59 (1972). But in this case 
Alabama has deliberately reallocated governmental power 
so that the elected officials in the Black Belt are unable 
to provide such solutions. 
This Court has long scrutinized with particular care 
governmental structuring of this sort. Neither Hunter v. 
8. 7 Tr. 18-19, 74, 82-83, 112-13. 
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Erickson nor any of its progeny involved a circuit split. 
Structuring schemes are typically idiosyncratic in nature, 
and for that reason different circuits do not have occasion 
to pass on the constitutionality of the same scheme. Like 
the schemes in Hunter, Washington, and Romer, the 
particular Alabama system was framed in response to 
local circumstances. It is the crippling and permanent 
nature of these types of restrictions that prompted this 
Court to grant plenary review in Hunter, Washington, and 
Romer, and which warrants review in the instant case. The 
impact of the Alabama constitutional provisions on tens of 
thousands of Black Belt school children, and on countless 
others in the state, is assuredly as important as the effect 
of the Colorado constitutional provision at issue in Romer, 
and the racial motives in the instant case implicate the 
core concerns of the Equal Protection Clause. 
The Court should grant review of all of the three 
questions presented. The millage caps and the assessment 
restrictions work in tandem, and the subsidiary issues 
they raise are inextricably intertwined. The caps and 
assessment restrictions are part of a single scheme, 
conceived in defiance of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, nurtured over the course of a century of Jim 
Crow, and enhanced to thwart the purposes of the Voting 
Rights Act, It is a scheme which has been all too effective 
in achieving its goal of assuring that Black Belt officials 
elected by black voters have little ability to require white 
landowners to pay taxes that could be used to educate 
black children. A n d it is a scheme which will continue to 
deny an adequate education to generations of Alabama 
public school students unless this Court acts. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, a writ of certiorari should 
issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 
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